Intentionalism and singularity
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UT Austin – November 5, 2019

Perceptual knowledge and belief
Experience is a propositional attitude: exing that p. When we take our experience at face value, we thereby believe, and in favorable circumstances know, the propositions that we ex.

Our perceptual knowledge/beliefs are based on knowledge/beliefs acquired in this way. So Singularity: We ex propositions about particular individuals in our environment.

We can gain knowledge by perception at the same time that we suffer illusions. So Multiplicity: We ex many propositions at a given time – that this object is a certain shape, that it is a certain color, that it is a certain distance from that object, etc.1

Phenomenology
A duplicate of me in a duplicate of my environment is a phenomenal duplicate of me, in the sense that what it’s like for them to have the experiences they are currently having is the same as what it’s like for me to have the experiences I am currently having. So, in some sense, phenomenology doesn’t care about the particular identities of the individuals we ex propositions about.

Framework (more tomorrow!): For any qualitative relation $R$, individuals $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, and function $f$ from individuals to individuals, let $f[Rx_1 \ldots x_n]$ be $Rf(x_1) \ldots f(x_n)$. Every proposition decomposes into the individuals it is about and the qualitative condition it predicates of those individuals, in such a way that, for any proposition $p$ and function $f$ from individuals to individuals, $f[p]$ is well-defined.

Proposal: A is a phenomenal duplicate of $B$ iff, for some permutation $f$, for all propositions $p$, $A$ exes that $p$ iff $B$ exes that $f[p]$.

Singular difficulties
Hallucination For all qualitative properties $F$, if $A$ is a phenomenal duplicate of $B$ and, for some $x$, $A$ exes that $Fx$, then, for some $x$, $B$ exes that $Fx$. Challenge: Someone hallucinating can be a phenomenal duplicate of someone perceiving normally, so there must be ‘objects of hallucination’.

Double vision For all qualitative relations $R$, if $A$ is a phenomenal duplicate of $B$ and for no $x$ does $A$ ex that $Rxx$, then for no $x$ does $B$ exes that $Rxx$. Challenge: Someone seeing double can be a phenomenal duplicate of someone accurately perceiving distinct objects, so seeing double doesn’t involve illusorily exing an object to be a certain distance from itself.

Generalism?
1. Contents far too weak; de se repair implausible.
2. ‘Binding’ (cf. Jackson’s ‘many property problem’) What if we only ex one big proposition, giving up Multiplicity too? Problem: knowledge from falsehood may happen sometimes, but not in the way it’d have to for this proposal to work. (Two coins case.)
3. De re knowledge/belief from general knowledge/belief may happen sometimes, but not in the way it’d have to for this proposal to work. (Symmetric creature with one eye open; false beliefs when color/spatial illusions cancel out.)
4. Granularity worries; e.g., $\exists x Fx \neq \exists x(\exists y. \exists x. Fx)x$.

Vehicularism?
For qualitative $n+m$-adic relations $R$ and partial functions $f$ defined on $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and undefined on $y_1, \ldots, y_m$, let $f[Rx_1 \ldots x_n y_1 \ldots y_m]$ be $\exists z_1 \ldots \exists z_m Rf(x_1) \ldots f(x_n) z_1 \ldots z_m$. Vehicularism: we ex propositions about representational vehicles (FINSTs; object-files). But when I ex that $p$ and take my experience at face value, the proposition I thereby believe isn’t $p$, but rather $f[p]$ for every partial function from vehicles to objects they track.

The hallucinatory spectrum
Planetarium $\rightarrow$ fiber-optic contact lenses $\rightarrow$ retinal simulator $\rightarrow$ thalamic stimulator $\rightarrow$ V1 stimulator $\rightarrow$ prefrontal stimulator.